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Counterfeit and substandard fasteners have severely
impacted the Department of Defense and the nation. This
thesis examines the issues involved.
The primary issues examined are: the background of the
fastener problem, the development and use of standards and
specifications, the specific standards used for fastener
procurement and how they were applied. The F/A-18 fastener
selection process is reviewed. Occurrences at the Defense
Industrial Supply Center relating to fasteners are
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I. INTRODUCTION TO STANDARDS AND FASTENERS
Fasteners play a crucial role in the world today.
Fasteners hold together bridges, buildings, turbines,
aircraft, and nearly any multi-assembly item. They are
sometimes taken for granted, as most individuals assume
fastening has been satisfactorily considered. Further,
there are a multitude of fasteners and fastener applica-
tions. Fastener standards are the basis for production,
procurement and use during the engineering process on
complex equipment.
Standards are the cornerstone of the fastener industry,
as in any industry. Recently, there has been some compro-
mise in the use of fastener standards. As a result, the
industry and the users are at risk.
A. STANDARDS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY
Standards are a quiet force in an exchange economy.
Their existence and use are generally not stressed in
education. However, standards are becoming increasingly
more important in controlling the problems in modern
society. They are a critical component in bridging the
communication gap between buyers and sellers, whether it is
a physical item or a procedure.
Standards perform controlling actions or functions.
This can be examined in the most basic sense in terms of
codes of behavior. If people do not conform to society's
customs, they will invariably be ostracized from the
community. This applies in an exchange economy. If
businesses do not follow their industry and legal standards
they will not be competitive, and will probably not survive.
There are two forms of standards: mandatory and
voluntary. Voluntary standards are normally generated by
trade associations and other specialized groups, such as the
Department of Defense (DoD) . These organizations generate
standards for their industry or group. They are written to
benefit the industry while attempting to satisfy the buyer.
Both voluntary and mandatory standards are generally
considered beneficial. They work because society has chosen
to comply with and accept them. The success of standards is
primarily attributed to the honesty of people, rather than
to regulations.
Enforcement of mandatory standards is accomplished by
civil remedies or criminal penalties such as fines or
imprisonment. Voluntary standards are enforced by the
market, with the buyer performing tests to ensure
compliance. Some standards include test methods for
verifying quality. However, they normally leave it to the
buyer to ensure the tests are performed.
B. THE ROLE OF FASTENERS
Fasteners have a far-reaching effect on the world today.
The fastener industry is one of the most basic elements in
any economy. It supplies over 40 billion bolts, nuts,
screws, rivets, and specially engineered products to the
automotive industry alone, each year.
Fasteners are critical elements, however, they are a
silent segment of the industrial world, similar to
standards. Rarely is there discussion of how fasteners
successfully perform in common applications. The quality of
bolts is generally taken for granted. Traditionally, the
quality has been unquestioned. However, there has been a
breakdown in the compliance of voluntary standards. This
has placed fasteners in an untenable situation in the market
place. The quality is no longer assumed or taken for
granted.
C . SUMMARY
Fasteners are key elements in the world economy today.
However, where the quality of fasteners used to be taken for
granted, that is no longer the case. The standards under
which fasteners are manufactured have not been universally
complied with.
This thesis will examine the counterfeit fastener
problem as it relates to the Department of Defense. The
related fasteners used by the military will be reviewed, as
well as the standards used to procure those fasteners, and
the methods by which the standards are applied within the
Department of Defense. An example of the selection and
procurement process of fasteners by the Navy will be
critiqued. This document will explore these questions and
provide some possible preventive measures.
II. COUNTERFEIT AND SUBSTANDARD FASTENERS
The term "fastener" is very broad. Fasteners can be
anything from lashings that hold wood together, to rivets,
nuts, bolts, and nails. Specifically, this thesis examines
the externally threaded class 8 and 8.2 bolts, where the
greatest problem with substandard and counterfeit fasteners
has been found to exist.
A. FASTENER STANDARDS
Fastener standards play several roles. A standard of
uniformity makes interchangeability between fastener
manufacturers possible. Standards of uniformity widen the
markets and increase the sources of supply by allowing easy
access to information and easy entry into the fastener
industry; which facilitates competition. [Ref. l:pp. 37-38]
Fastener standards also provide standards of quality.
This is exemplified by the use of grading systems. The
grade usually indicates uniform products. In the case of
fasteners, quality is also addressed. Each grade gives
specific measurements for quality and a means of testing
those measurements.
Several organizations write fastener standards. The
primary fastener standard writing organizations are: the
U.S. government, the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) , The American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) , the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
,
the Industrial Fasteners Institute (IFI) , and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
.
Many of the standards generated by these organizations
duplicate or build on the other organizations' standards.
An example would be ASTM standard A 3 54-86. The base
document for this standard is SAE standard J429. The ASTM
standard then builds on the base, indicating the additional
requirements necessary for a fastener to be identified by
this standard.
The use and compliance of standards generally benefits
the market. However, ensuring compliance of fastener
standards has been eliminated for the sellers by the
standards writing organizations. The standards, as drafted,
indicate that the buyers are responsible to ensure
compliance with the standard. For example, ASTM standard A
354 inspection requirements are "If the inspection described
in 11.2 is required by the purchaser, it shall be specified
in the inquiry and contract or purchase order." The SAE
specification J429 calls for the manufacturer to perform
tests. There is no requirement in either standard to report
substandard test results to the buyer, unless specifically
requested.
As standards are currently written, the buyer is
responsible for assuring that the fasteners meet the
standards. Currently, only the large fastener consumers
have the resources to satisfy the testing requirements of
the standards described. However, most buyers of fasteners
are small businesses. A large company, such as Lockheed,
has laboratories internal to the corporation for in-depth
testing of fasteners. Small purchasers must contract out
for laboratory testing of incoming stock, if they wish to
verify the fastener's grade.
B. FASTENER TYPES
Following is a brief explanation of how the grading
system for bolts, screws, studs, and U-bolts is organized.
The Society of Automotive Engineers standard J429 covers
the mechanical and material requirements for steel bolts,
screws, studs, and U-bolts used in automotive and related
industries. The bolts are in grades 1, 2, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 7,
8, and 8.2. Appendix A is the table from SAE standard J429.
A comparison of 8 and 8.2 bolts will follow, as they were
the most commonly counterfeited or substandard fasteners.
Grade 8 fastener products are bolts, screws, and studs.
These fasteners must have a proof load of 120,000 pounds per
square inch and a tensile strength of 150,000 pounds per
square inch. The yield strength minimum must be 130,000
pounds per square inch. This grade of fastener will perform
satisfactorily to service temperatures up to 450 degrees
fahrenheit. They must have a surface hardness of 58.6 on
the Rockwell 30N hardness scale, and a minimum and maximum
core hardness of C33 to C39 on the Rockwell C hardness
scale. The hardness scales will remain consistent
throughout this thesis for comparison purposes. Figure 1




Figure 1. Grade Markings
The material composition of grade 8 fasteners is a
medium carbon alloy steel. The carbon alloy consists of
carbon, manganese, silicon, copper, and a limited amount of
chromium. There are other elements that can be used to
produce a medium carbon alloy steel. When produced, the
grade 8 steel fastener must consist of, at a minimum, 28%,
and no more than 55% of the medium carbon alloy. The
Society of Automotive Engineers standard J429 allows the
buyer and producer to specify the exact medium carbon alloy
which will be used. Both grades 8 and 8.2 fasteners are
quenched and tempered.
The benefit of a medium carbon alloy steel is a fastener
with more load carrying capability per unit cost of any
known metal. These fasteners are known as "forgiving" as
they can absorb punishment and service abuse. They possess
the most attractive balance between cost, manufacturing
convenience, and superlative mechanical properties. [Ref.
2:p. 63]
Grade 8.2 products are bolts and screws. These
fasteners must have a proof load of 120,000 pounds per
square inch and a tensile strength of 150,000 pounds per
square inch. The minimum yield strength must be 13 0,000
pounds per square inch. Grade 8.2 fasteners do not perform
as well as the grade 8 fasteners in temperature extremes.
They must have a surface hardness of 61 on the Rockwell 30N
hardness scale, and a minimum and maximum core hardness of
C35 to C42 on the Rockwell C hardness scale. Figure 1 shows
the headmarkings for 8.2.
The material composition of grade 8.2 fasteners is a low
carbon martensite steel. This is not an alloy steel. The
carbon martensite content must fall between 15% and 25% of
the total fastener weight. [Ref. 3:pp. 125-130] Boron is
also an element of this steel. By adding boron, the grade
8.2 bolt will have the same strength properties as the grade
8 bolt. However, this addition causes fastener performance
at elevated temperatures to be inferior, which makes grade 8
bolts generally preferred for the higher strength demands.
[Ref. 2:pp. 65-66]
Grade 8.2 has excellent workability and strength
properties. This type of fastener can be case hardened and
welded. Case hardening hardens the surface of a fastener by
a high temperature shallow infusion of carbon followed by
quenching. Grade 8.2 has extended life, and improved
surface quality. Further, it eliminates the need to anneal
or temper the material prior to placing the head on the
fastener. Use of this type of material is economically
attractive, however, its stress relaxation properties at
moderately elevated temperatures is inferior. There is
potential to use the low carbon martensite steel in loads
where the bolt would be required to fail before the nut or
expensive end item. [Ref. 2:pp. 61-63]
Selection between the grades 8 and 8.2 fasteners is
determined by application. The grade 8 fastener would more
probably be used in an application such as engine parts.
The grade 8.2 would be found holding structures together,
particularly if welding to the fastener was required. Cost
is also a factor. The least expensive fastener material is
low carbon steel. As the carbon content increases, alloying
elements are also added, which drives up the cost. There-
fore, grade 8.2 fasteners are less expensive. For a large
consumer of fasteners, such as DoD, using grade 8.2 can be a
significant cost savings, if the performance requirements
can be satisfied. [Ref. 2:p. 42]
Headmarkings are required for grades 8 and 8.2
fasteners. They must be marked as indicated in Figure 1 and
Appendix A. Further, the manufacturer's identification
symbol must be marked on the top of the head. This provides
a means for identifying the manufacturer after the fastener
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has been purchased. The American Society for Testing and
Materials standards have similar requirements for their high
grade steel fasteners.
The SAE standard J429 calls out five general fastener
tests or methods. Those tests are: hardness, surface
hardness, proof load, axial tensile strength, and wedge
tensile strength. Grades 8 and 8.2 fasteners require some,
or all the tests, depending on the length of the fastener.
Hardness is the only test required regardless of the
fastener length.
The hardness test is a measure of a material's ability
to resist abrasion and indentation. This test is tremen-
dously important as a specification. It is quick, easy to
perform, and nondestructive. There is also a close correla-
tion between the hardness and the tensile strength of steel
fasteners. It is performed at mid-radius in the threaded
portion of the fastener. The hardness reported is the
average of four readings located 90 degrees from one
another. The minimum value corresponds to the minimum
tensile strength. The maximum value represents a level of
hardness beyond which the fastener would be unacceptably
brittle.
Surface hardness testing, as the name indicates, is the
hardness of the fastener's surface. This test is performed
on the ends or unthreaded shanks of the fasteners. It has
similar benefits to the hardness test, with slightly less
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reliable results. The surface hardness is not always
uniform across the entire surface of a fastener. This is a
limitation of the manufacturing process. As a result, the
surface hardness test can indicate artificially high
hardness, depending on the location of the test. When this
occurs, additional testing is required prior to failing a
fastener for excessive hardness.
A proof load test consists of stressing the fastener
with a specified load without permanent deformation. The
proof load is an absolute evaluation. The length of the
fastener is measured prior to the test and then remeasured
after the load has been removed. There should be no differ-
ences in the length of the fastener, less allowances for
measurement error.
There are two types of tensile strength tests, axial and
wedge. The tensile test measures the maximum tension
applied load which a fastener can support before or coinci-
dent with its failure. The axial test measures a direct
load on the fastener. The wedge test places a beveled wedge
under the head of the fastener. When the test is being
performed, the wedge induces a severe bending stress at the
joint of the head of the fastener and the shank. The




The counterfeit and substandard fastener issue deals
with the introduction of falsely marked and nonconforming
fasteners into inventories of the Department of Defense and
the civilian sector. This question has drawn much media
attention. The impact can be far-reaching, and the facts of
the issue can be clouded by the sensationalism of the in-use
failures of counterfeit and substandard fasteners.
The counterfeit and substandard fastener problem was
initially discovered in January 1985 by Grant Fasteners
Incorporated, of Houston, Texas. The company found
fasteners of unknown origin and content in their inventory.
Mr. Tommy Grant, the owner of Grant Fasteners, did not know
if the fasteners were nonconforming or counterfeit. As the
actual source was unknown, so were the engineering capabili-
ties of the fasteners.
The exact point in time when the bad fasteners started
entering the country is unknown. It is estimated to have
begun in 1974. Mr. Sims, a special assistant to the House
of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions, stated, "The evidence that we have is that Americans
actually went over there [Japan] in the beginning and had
the bolts made with the wrong markings on them." Initially,
the organizations sponsoring counterfeiting appeared to be
distributors trying to obtain a competitive market
advantage. When it was determined that this was not
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difficult, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese firms followed
suit. [Ref. 4:p. 58]
The Industrial Fasteners Institute (IFI) , which is a
fastener manufacture's trade organization, learned of Mr.
Grant's observations and they submitted eight samples from
Grant Fasteners' inventory for testing. The samples were
submitted 12 June 1985, and were all marked as grade 8
fasteners, according to SAE standard J429. Four of the
eight fasteners were improperly marked and those that were
marked were not recognized as a North American manufacturer.
None of the eight fasteners were made of the correct
combination of materials called for by the SAE standard.
Based upon the test results, the IFI initiated a program
to test samples from geographic areas adjacent to water-
fronts in the United States. Over 300 samples were obtained
and tested. The conclusion was 70% of the samples submitted
were out of specification tolerances. The IFI notified
their member companies in April 1986 and issued a news
release to the general public on 2 May 1986.
The Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) became aware
of the fastener problem when the IFI issued their press
release in May 1986. On 2 July 1986, DISC issued an alert
on the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
,
warning of the problem. They also started their own
investigation at about the same time. By October, DISC had
completed testing of 321 samples, which confirmed IFI's
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concerns. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , of which DISC
is a subordinate command, issued a news release on 12
December 1986, reporting their findings.
A follow-on investigation was started by DISC to inspect
their inventory, to support criminal investigations, and to
develop strategies to prevent recurrence. The investiga-
tions led to DISC freezing their grade 8 inventories in June
1987. By 15 July 1987, DISC determined that approximately
29% of its grade 8 inventory failed because of improper
material composition. DISC ultimately expects to find a
failure rate at around 25% in their existing inventories;
the failure rate reduction resulting from more precise
statistical procedures. [Ref. 4:p. 190]
In December 1988, DISC declared their inventories clear
of nonconforming fasteners and that testing of new incoming
orders indicated 100% conforming stock. Their corrective
actions to prevent recurrences were:
- Tighten up procurement policies.
- Institute contract clauses calling for better tracea-
bility of fasteners.
- Institute contract clauses addressing test measurement
equipment.
- Sample and test each grade 8 contract.
The civilian fastener market has been grappling with the
problem since it was discovered. The IFI has published an
advisory for correcting the situation. Their recommended
actions include:
15
- Making manufacturers' headmarks mandatory.
- Qualifying all fastener vendors.
- Continuing U.S. Customs Service investigations of all
bolts.
- Examining and purging fastener stocks.
- Reviewing all past purchases. [Ref. 5:pp. 9-10]
The IFI believes that the root causes of the fastener
problem are greedy and unscrupulous distributors who import
the material. They also suspect that some federal acquisi-
tion regulations compound the problem; particularly the
$25,000 window which allows federal agencies to make
purchases below that amount without prior qualification of
the vendor. [Ref. 5:p. 8]
The greed has been allowed to exist because of the
market organization. With all standards being voluntary,
there is an incentive to take advantage of the market
condition by counterfeiting. Current standards do not have
any means for enforcement, which simplifies counterfeiting.
The actual volume of fasteners used is large. It is
estimated that over seven billion bolts and large screws are
used in the United States each year. Of those, approximate-
ly 20% are of the high strength grade 8 class. The grade 8
bolt is used in over 500 different weapons systems.
Annually, over $3.4 billion are consumed on fasteners. The
C-5A aircraft uses 2.2 million fasteners on each airframe.
At a more personal level, the number of fasteners used on
dishwashers manufactured each year is about 270.8 million.
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Ranges use 369.3 million fasteners, and clothes dryers use
688 million fasteners. These examples represent all types
of fasteners, not just grades 8 and 8.2. It is obvious that
the nation could not operate without fasteners. [Ref. 6: pp.
56-67]
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an overview of the fastener
problem and how it developed. To show the magnitude of the
situation, a review of fastener consumption and use has been
presented.
A general description of grades 8 and 8.2 fasteners was
supplied, with direct reference to the SAE standard J429,
which is the basis from which grades 8 and 8.2 are derived.
Key elements in the testing, marking, and use of the
fasteners were considered.
A description of fastener standard setting organizations
was presented. There was an examination of the role of
standards in the fastener industry. Additionally,
compliance with voluntary fasteners was reviewed. The
majority of standard compliance responsibilities is placed
upon the consumer.
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III. STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS
Standards and specifications are critical components in
any economic exchange. They are the elements in the
contracting process that serve as a basis for defining what
the buyer and seller exchange. Accurate and usable
standards and specifications have a significant effect on
the successful procurement or sale of any material or
service. This fact is equally applicable in both the
civilian and military economies.
A . BACKGROUND
The need for standards and uniformity has long been
recognized. Weights and measures to control dealings
between individuals are the earliest known written
standards. These were developed 5000 years ago by the
Egyptians. The standard system was called the Egyptian
Royal Cubit. This system was widely used for a time.
However, as civilizations succeeded each other, the system
failed. [Ref. 7:pp. 5-6]
As the world shrunk with improved transportation and
communications systems, the problems associated with a lack
of standards have been highlighted by hardship. For
example, at the outbreak of World War II there was no
unified screw-thread standard between the Allies. Early in
the war, supply depots had identical parts, with the
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exception of fasteners. There was an emergency compromise,
but after the war the problem remained.
The Department of Defense (DoD) determined that standar-
dization and specifications could improve operational
readiness and cost effectiveness. DoD's Defense Standardi-
zation and Specification Program (DSSP) was established in
1952. It was intended to be a single, integrated defense-
wide program with a uniform series of specifications,
standards, and related documents. DSSP is under the
cognizance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering. Further, there remains a statutory
requirement for this program. [Ref. 8: p. 9]
The DSSP primarily applies to common use systems, sub-
systems, equipment, components, parts, materials,
engineering practices, and technical data. The objective is
to ensure material standardization throughout the design,
development, and acquisition processes. There are two
general procedures which DSSP is tasked with:
(a) a planned program under which specifications,
standards, handbooks, engineering drawings and other
standardization documents are prepared and maintained to
meet essential requirements with optimum efficiency; and
(b) a decentralized program with management authority and
responsibilities of portions of the program delegated to
the DoD components. [Ref. 9: p. c-13]
The DoD Index of Specifications and Standards lists more
than 45,000 standardization documents produced by the
Federal Government or industry groups. The result is
19
reduced duplicative development and testing costs, and
control of the proliferation of items in DoD inventories.
Mr. F.A. Sweet, formerly with the Canadian Standards
Association, believes there are four basic values of
standards: they educate, they simplify, they conserve, and
they are a base upon which to certify. Standards educate in
the sense that they set forth ideals or quality goals. They
enable manufacturers and consumers to be more knowledgeable
about the exchanges they are making. Standards simplify by
reducing the number of sizes, the variety of processes, and
the amount of inventory. Without standards, these items
would tend to increase the overhead costs of doing business,
which the consumers must pay. Conservation is obtained by
more precise controls, careful design, and more efficient
large scale production. Finally, standards become the basis
for determining quality. This can be critically important
in a free market economy. [Ref. 7:p. X]
In a broad sense, a standard is a "category of documents
whose function is to control some aspect of human endeavor."
[Ref. 7:p. 2]
There are two general standard types. They are
standards for uniformity and standards of quality.
Standards for uniformity are concerned with a product being
consistent or the same. For instance, thread types on
fasteners must be consistent between manufacturers for wide
commercial acceptance. Quality standards consider better or
20
worse. Traditionally, these standards are specified in
minimum values. "Better" means the item meets the standard,
"worse" means it does not. Quality standards are more
likely to require enforcement. [Ref. l:pp. 8-9]
In the micro, business sense, standardization and
standards have specific meanings. These definitions apply
in both the civilian and military sectors.
Standardization is defined as: "a management function
for the coordination of individual decisions with the
objective of optimizing diversity." [Ref. 10:p. 4] In
simpler terms the statement implies: be consistent in what
items are utilized unless there is a strong overriding
reason not to remain standardized.
Standards are defined as: "documents that establish
engineering and technical requirements for processes,
procedures, practices and methods that have been adopted as
[routine] standard." Their function is to control variety.
Specifications: "establish requirements in terms of
complete design details or in terms of performance, but in
most cases in terms of both design and performance." [Ref.
ll:pp. 10-11]
B. VOLUNTARY STANDARDS
Differing from most foreign countries, the United States
allows private organizations to do most of the creation of
standards. There are approximately 400 private groups that
perform these functions. As an illustration, in 1964 less
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than 3% of the 14,000 standards existing were written by the
government. [Ref. l:p. 81]
The United States has no formal standards policy. The
National Standards Policy Committee (NSPAC) recommended
development of a national policy in 1977. It was suggested
that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) fill
this role. A document to this effect was released for
public comment. However, some organizations could not see
ANSI filling this role without changing its structure. ANSI
has responded to the recommended changes and their plan was
released for public review in January 1981. Because of the
factors involved, the restructuring plan has not yet been
fully implemented. [Ref. 7:pp. 14-15]
ANSI is an unusual standards organization. They do not
create standards, but rather they act as the national
coordinating organization for standards. ANSI encourages
development and approves standards which are supported by a
national consensus.
According to Charles D. Sullivan, ANSI's purposes are:
(1) Serve as the national coordinating institute for
voluntary standardization and certification activities of
the United States; (2) to further the voluntary standards
movement as a means of advancing the national economy; (3)
to insure that the interests of the public have appropri-
ate protection and participation; (4) to provide the means
of determining standards and certification programs; (5)
to establish, promulgate, and administer procedures and
criteria for recognition and approval of standards as
American national standards; (6) to establish procedures
for recognition and accreditation of certification
programs; (7) to cooperate with government standards and
voluntary standards of industry; (8) to promote knowledge
and use of American national standards and accreditations;
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(9) to represent the interests of the United States in
international, non-treaty standardization and accredi-
tation programs; (10) to serve as a clearing house for
information on standards and certification in the United
States and abroad. [Ref. 7:pp. 29-30]
There are many voluntary standards setting organizations
in the United States. They are composed primarily of
industry trade associations or various specialized engineer-
ing societies. Examples include; The American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) , The Institute of Electrical
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , The American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) , and The National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA)
.
These societies consist of members from the industries
they represent. The people who write the standards are
theoretically independent of their full time employers.
They help develop standards while, often, on company time.
Therefore, the companies using the new standards are well
represented during standards creation. Consequently,
standards are not always as objective nor do they serve the
general good of an industry as they might otherwise be. It
is possible that a standard would be written in a specific
manner simply because a dominant corporation desires it.
When large corporations have such a dominant role in
setting standards, it follows that new standards are written
in their best interest. Although not necessarily incorrect,
this aids in the dominant companies remaining dominant. It
also makes market entry difficult for new firms. In effect.
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these types of standard setting procedures may not always
work in the public's best interest. [Ref. l:pp. 89-90]
The use of voluntary standards is generally open to all.
Organizations like ASTM encourage the use of their
standards. In fact, without widespread use of the voluntary
standards already generated, conducting business would be
severely hampered. To demonstrate how significant standards
are, Figure 2 shows the use of standards in typical
aerospace applications.
C. GOVERNMENT STANDARDS
The standards and specifications used by the Department
of Defense (DoD) are divided into three groups: federal,
military, and nongovernment. Federal specifications cover a
large portion of civilian type products and services used by
DoD. Military standards and specifications pertain to
products and services that are inherently military. There
are over 4 5,000 military standards documents. The
nongovernment standards are voluntary standards issued by
organizations like the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
and ASTM. These standards are available to the general
public. The order of preference for DoD is nongovernment,
federal specification, and military specification. [Ref.
8:p. 12]
There are three basic federal standards documents:
Commercial Item Descriptions (CIDs) , Federal specifications,
and Federal standdards. CIDs are federal specifications
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Figure 2 . Use of Standards in Typical Aerospace Products
which describe the key physical or functional characteris-
tics of acceptable commercial products. This type of
specification is used when there are a minimum of special
requirements. Federal specifications contain a complete
description of the required items or materials. They are
used when a CID cannot adequately describe what is required
and the specification will be used by two or more federal
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agencies. A federal specification might be used to purchase
a two-way radio with an unusual frequency range. The final
type is a federal standard. Federal standards cover
engineering or management processes, practices, or
techniques having multiple agency interest.
Military standards documents are in two groups:
military specifications and military standards. Military
specifications, like federal specifications, are a descrip-
tion of a product, service, process, or procedure. They
also usually are a significantly modified commercial product
which satisfies military requirements. Military standards
are like federal standards, and as before, they must be
intrinsically military. These standards are identified as
MIL-STDs or DoD-STDs (for metric standards)
.
Nongovernment standards are drafted in accordance with
the association's or society's policies. These are commonly
called voluntary standards. The government uses these
standards in three ways: adoption, reference, or excerpts.
[Ref. 8:pp. 12-14]
Government standards are generally open to all. As
indicated in Figure 2, the standards are widely used outside
the military and federal government.
D. STANDARDS BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
The single greatest benefit of standards is the service
they provide in an open economy. Without standards the
modern industrial world would not have progressed nearly as
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fast. Standards allow uniformity, which provides for inter-
changeability. When advances in technology have occurred,
they have been standardized. This standardization has aided
in other organizations building on what has been previously
developed and capitalizing on economies of scale. The whole
process has expedited growth in open economies. The
necessity of standards is reflected by the fact that many
voluntary standards become laws.
The Department of Defense has four specific purposes or
identified benefits of standardization. They are:
- To reduce unnecessary and inefficient proliferation of
generally similar items.
- To reduce risks associated with developing and producing
new products and services.
- To use standardization as a stepping stone for
evolutionary improvements.
- To conserve resources by minimizing training, technical
data, engineering and support requirements. [Ref. 8: p.
3]
One benefit is improved knowledge for the buyer. Tradi-
tionally, buyers have less information than the sellers.
Sellers, when they are the manufacturers, have intimate
knowledge of the product. Occasionally, they even set the
industry standard for a particular product. The only time
the buyer can counter this situation is when they are large
or well organized. General Motors was able to act as the
large buyer. They successfully influenced the production of
gas types because they produced the machines that consumed
27
the fuel. Standards are a factor in leveling out the
knowledge imbalance.
The use of standardization in Federal Supply Class 5962
realized nearly $1 billion in cost avoidances. This supply
class covers microcircuit devices. The results cited here
were achieved through the standardization effort on one
standard; MIL-M-38510/101. [Ref. 10:pp. 69-70]
There are basically two drawbacks to standardization:
withholding of desired variety from the market and facilita-
tion of illegal activity. The withholding of desired
variety would include over-standardization and the problems
associated with quality levels being set at undesirable
points via standards.
Although less common than illegal activity from
standards, withholding of wanted variety does occur. The
seller usually supports standards that will limit the use of
lower profit items from the market. For example, the
airlines resisted the introduction of coach seats. More
recently, U.S. automobile manufacturers resisted the small
car. [Ref. l:p. 31]
Standards of uniformity may induce oligopolistic collu-
sion. With developed standards, it is much easier to fix
prices. They can also be used to handicap or exclude
competitors from the market. If the specification or
standard is written in a certain form, it can eliminate
certain competition. An example: the APS plastic pipe
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manufacturers fought back when local building codes
prohibited the use of non-steel pipes. [Ref. l:p. 77] An
oligopolistic market may not always be considered a
drawback. In markets that require large capital invest-
ments, an oligopolistic environment is the only system that
would prevail.
For the Department of Defense, the greatest drawback to
voluntary standards is that most of them address test
methods, processes, recommended practices, and safety. Of
the 35,000 nongovernmental standards, 8000 are product
standards. As DoD will not use the process type standard,
this eliminates over 75% of the voluntary standards
available. [Ref. 12:p. 9]
Standard setting organizations are producing additional
standards that can increase the confusion level. For
example, there are six different standards for approximately
the same load bearing requirements as the grade 8 bolt.
This also increases the cost of using the standards. Which
organization's standard to use and which standard will be
acceptable in both cost and application may be the real
questions for the standards user. [Ref. 13 :p. 8]
E. GOVERNMENT SELECTION OF STANDARDS
The Department of Defense supports standardization and
views it as a method to efficiently use resources. There
are specific directives on the use of standards. The
defense standardization and specification program directive,
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DoD Directive 4120.3, specifically states "Documents issued
by nongovernmental standards producing organizations shall
be adopted and used instead of military documents."
The priorities follow: voluntary standards, federal
standards and military standards. There has been a policy
shift within DoD to increase the use of voluntary standards.
The goal, eventually, will be to develop voluntary standards
with the private sector and reduce the use of MILSTDs.
Other branches of the government are working with the
Department of Defense in accomplishing this goal. [Ref.
12:p. 36]
F. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN VOLUNTARY STANDARD SETTING
The government intervenes in standard setting when it
believes that private industry, or the public generally,
will not act in their own best interest. An example of this
might be the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which set
standards for worker safety and healthful conditions on the
job. This act created the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) . Prior to OSHA, numerous industries
such as textiles, steel mills, and coal mines had a high
degree of safety and health-related risks on the job.
However, the employers were considered free of any responsi-
bility for job-related injuries. Congress felt that private
industry would not act in their employees' best interest
without it being forced upon them. Additionally, passing
the law implied that the workers were powerless to cause
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safety standards to be implemented. OSHA was intended to
protect every working person from hazardous working environ-
ments. Employers now must comply with OSHA's safety and
health regulations.
There were two bills before the House of Representatives
concerning standards and fastener quality issues. The bills
were HR 5051, The Fastener Quality Assurance Act of 1988,
and HR 512 0, The Standardization of Measurement Act of 1988.
However, the two bills were combined into HR 3000. HR 3000
was still pending when this thesis was being prepared.
1. The Fastener Quality Assurance Act. HR 5051
This Act's purpose is "To require that certain
fasteners sold in commerce conform to the specifications to
which they are represented to be manufactured and to provide
for the approval of accreditation systems for laboratories
testing fasteners sold in commerce." [Ref. 9: p. 1]
A House Investigating Committee investigated
counterfeiting problems in the fastener industry. The
volume of fasteners sold was in the billions. Millions of
those fasteners were mismarked, substandard, counterfeit, or
nonconforming. The Committee determined the military and
civilian sectors were being endangered and subject to
extraordinary expenses as a result of the substandard
fasteners. Further, most of the nonconforming fasteners
were produced abroad; which is not surprising as 80% of the
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fasteners used in the United States are produced abroad.
House Resolution 5051 was submitted to correct this problem.
The methods used to correct the problem are in three
categories:
- Testing and certification of fasteners.
- Manufacturers' insignias.
- Remedies.
There are a set of requirements for fasteners prior to their
being offered for sale, under the testing and certification
aspects of the bill. These requirements include laboratory
accreditation, laboratory certification of each lot, distri-
butors' responsibilities, and fasteners of foreign origin.
The manufacturers' insignias section requires that
all high strength fasteners bear an insignia prior to sale
or interstate commerce. The Secretary of Commerce will be
required to catalog the insignias.
Remedies are classified as civil remedies and
criminal penalties. The civil penalties provide for injunc-
tive relief against any person who falsely represents his
products. The criminal penalties effect a means for
punishing those persons who knowingly misrepresent their
products. Under this bill, they can be fined and/or
imprisoned for up to ten years. [Ref. 14:pp. 1-12]
HR 5051 has support from the Industrial Fasteners
Institute. They view the bill as a means to correct what
they deem as an attack on the engineering standards of North
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America. They are urging their members to write Congress in
support of this bill. [Ref. 15:p. 8] There is broad
support from individual companies. They have expressed
their support for the bill both in Congressional testimony
and through their industry publications. The American
Association for Laboratory Accreditation supports HR 5051 as
a more responsive and less expensive solution to the
fastener problems, vice HR 5120. [Ref. 16:pp. 91-92]
There is not unanimous support for HR 5051. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) thought
the bill was well-written and well-intended. However, they
believe the bill will "merely impose additional, burdensome,
and possibly ineffective regulatory requirements...." [Ref.
16 :p. 78] There are several small businesses that believe
HR 5051 will create excessive paperwork requirements. The
Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology hearings
record contains several letters to that effect. They were
submitted by a number of small fastener distributors, such
as the Dell Fastener Corporation, and Uneeda Bolt & Screw
Company. [Ref. 16:pp. 100-105]
2 . The Standardization of Measurement Act, HR 5120
The purpose of this act is "To provide for a system
of standardization of measurement of bolts to increase bolt
quality and reduce the danger of substandard bolt failure,
and for other purposes." [Ref. 17 :p. 1]
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The Congressional Investigating Subcommittee found
that "Counterfeit and substandard bolts and other metal
fasteners pervade the United States economy, and their use
has dramatically increased the risk of equipment and infra-
structure failures...." [Ref. 17: pp. 1-2] Problems with
standards of measurement and testing were also identified.
HR 5120 is a proposed solution to those problems.
To accomplish the purposes of the bill and correct
the identified problems, the National Bureau of Standards
(NBS) is tasked with several activities. They must:
- Develop recommendations for improving standardization of
bolt measurement.
- Coordinate with voluntary standardization organizations
the methods in which to implement the recommendations.
- Accredit laboratories for performing the testing
required by the recommendations.
If HR 5120 had been passed and signed, effective 1
January 1991, bolts would have been certified under this
bill before they could be defined as high strength steel
bolts.
A review of current literature indicates no support
for HR 5120. Congressional records and testimony have
repeatedly favored HR 5051 over HR 5120, or have been
completely against HR 5120. The organizations that do not
support this bill include: NASA, NBS, Industrial Fasteners
Institute, and the Aerospace Industries Association, to name
a few. The general opinion appears that this is not the
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most effective method to solve the fastener problem. [Ref.
16:pp. 82-106]
3. The Fastener Quality Act. HR 3000
This Act is a compromise of HR 512 and 5051. For
whatever political reasons, the two bills were combined.
Some provisions that were unacceptable in HR 512 have been
deleted or revised in this bill.
The purpose of the bill is to:
...require that certain fasteners sold in commerce conform
to the specifications to which they are represented to be
manufactured, to provide for accreditation of laboratories
engaged in fastener testing, to require inspection,
testing, and certification, in accordance with
standardized methods, of fasteners used in critical
applications to increase fastener quality and reduce the
danger of fastener failure,.... [Ref. 18:p. 2]
To accomplish this, several procedures will be
required by law. All fasteners will be required to conform
to the standard represented by the manufacturer and be
tested, inspected, and certified to that effect. The
testing, inspecting and certifying will have to be
accomplished by a certified lab. A laboratory certifica-
tion program will be established in the Department of
Commerce.
There is a small lot exception for the testing,
inspecting, and certifying requirements. This allows lots
of less than 50 fasteners to be sold without the requirement
for testing. The intent is to relieve the small businesses
of the burden and cost of complying with the law.
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The sale of fasteners subsequent to manufacture will
also have requirements under this bill. All fasteners sold
will have a certification from the original manufacturer.
This also applies to fasteners of foreign origin. It will
be against the law to comingle lots of fasteners with one
another. All fasteners will be required to have head
markings identifying the manufacturer.
There are both civil and criminal penalties under
this bill. Under the civil paragraph, injunctive relief can
be provided. The criminal penalties allow for up to five
years in jail.
As this bill was just recently drafted, there has
not been any recorded feedback regarding support. However,
the National Fastener Distributors Association worked with
the committees drafting this bill and it is assumed they
support the current document.
G . SUMMARY
In this chapter, an overview of standards and specifica-
tions has been presented. It included the sources of
standards, how they are set and how they are used. The
benefits and drawbacks were considered. The government's
policy in selecting standards was discussed and finally the
government • s attempt at intervention in the standards
setting process was reviewed.
Standards are a key element in the procurement process.
Though not without flaws, they have served the purposes
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intended. Future development in standardization, with items
such as living specifications and automated standard
retrieval, will undoubtedly improve the process.
37
IV. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER
The Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) is an
excellent example for examining how a buyer defines and
assures fastener grades. They are the largest government
organization in terms of numbers of fasteners purchased.
The introduction of counterfeit fasteners at DISC appears to
have evolved from an assortment of factors. The counterfeit
fastener problem, however, is nationwide and not exclusively
within DISC. What they have experienced and learned,
however, is important to all Department of Defense (DoD)
activities that procure fasteners.
A. HISTORY
The counterfeit fastener problem first came to light in
January 1985 when Mr. Grant, of Grant Fasteners, became
aware that fasteners in his inventory were of questionable
origin. He had suspected a problem for several years prior
to 1985. However, the fasteners which could prove his
suspicions did not surface until that time. The Industrial
Fasteners Institute (IFI) , which is a fastener manufacturers
trade organization, was informed of the growing counterfeit
fastener problem in the commercial market by late 1985, when
Mr. Grant's suspicions were reported to them.
The IFI conducted an investigation and published the
results in May 1986, with copies to the Congress and several
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federal agencies, including the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) , of which DISC is a subordinate command. DISC, and
many private firms, were receiving bad fasteners during this
period and probably had been for several years. [Ref. 16 :p.
32]
In response to the IFI information, DISC began their own
investigation resulting in a Congressional investigation and
a freeze of Disc's grade 8 fastener inventory in June 1987.
Subsequently, they tested over 12,000 specimens and
evaluated 1200 contracts. There was a 30% test failure rate
of DISC inventories. They sent out notices to their
customers warning of the problem. [Refs. 16:pp. 48, 58]
DISC took positive corrective action. However, the
action was initiated over a year after they became aware of
the problem. They changed their procurement policies to
include new clauses covering better traceability to the
manufacturer, requirements for the manufacturer's logo on
each bolt head, and which type of test measurement equipment
was called for when verifying fastener quality.
DISC now inspects each contract. Additionally, they
have taken some remedial actions against suppliers who
knowingly delivered counterfeit fasteners. Those actions
have included debarments and legal proceedings. [Ref. 16: p.
70] More specifically, DLA established procedures for
reimbursement, repair, or replacement of fasteners that did
not conform to contract specifications. There were 15
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investigations for criminal action in August 1987, but no
indictments have been issued in those cases. [Ref. 4: pp.
233-234]
Today DISC believes their inventories have been purged
of counterfeit fasteners. Their new procurement policies
appear to have virtually eliminated bad products entering
the DoD supply system via DISC. Their acceptance rate is
nearly 100%. Suppliers are ostensibly no longer attempting
to deceive the government because the institution of the
acceptance test requirements assures that deviations will be
detected. [Ref. 4:pp. 197-198]
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Many of the basic procurement policies, regulations, and
laws contributed to DISC'S fastener problem. Their internal
procedures aggravated a bad situation. Between DISC'S own
procurement practices and federal regulations the stage was
set for the counterfeiting of fasteners.
1 . Internal Factors
Disc's procurement practices were inconsistent.
Contracts were let for fasteners based on MILSTDs, most of
which are based on voluntary civilian standards. The
civilian standards place the responsibility for assuring the
contracted quality on the buyer. In the case of grades 8
and 8.2 fasteners, DISC procured these under SAE standard
J429 which specifically places the responsibility on the
consumer for assurance of quality contracted. [Ref. 4: p.
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189] DISC, however, relied on paper certificates of
compliance to assure the required grade. This was the least
cost means of ensuring that the required products were
received, but it proved ineffective. The Chief of the Test
and Evaluation Division of DISC, Mr. James Nicolo, concedes
that the counterfeit fastener problem in general was allowed
to occur because of "a situation of inadequate enforcement
of standard requirements." [Ref. 16 :p. 48]
Once the counterfeit fasteners entered DISC'S
inventories, it was virtually impossible to trace back to
the manufacturer or supplier. Suppliers were not required
to have head markings on the bolts. Some of the distribu-
tors provided fasteners with head markings, but the govern-
ment had an incomplete record of which markings applied to
which fastener manufacturer. The result was that the
government received little value by having the head
markings.
On those occasions when DISC could track down the
supplier, they were usually small businesses who only
distributed fasteners, rather than manufacturing them. They
would respond by indicating that the fasteners were
purchased in good faith from distributors or by going out of
business altogether. For these reasons, after-the-fact
enforcement was ineffective and did not prevent counterfeit
fasteners from entering into the supply system.
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DISC was aware of the counterfeit fastener problem
for approximately 13 months before they froze their
inventories. When questioned about why DISC did not act
sooner, General Pigaty, the Commander of DISC, stated, "I
don't think we had a real appreciation for how big the
problem was." He also believed that DISC was aggressive in
pursuing the counterfeit issue, however, they were "Somewhat
uncoordinated." [Ref. 4:pp. 198-199]
2 . External Factors
DISC certainly knew their system did not respond
correctly in assuring quality and contract compliance.
However, there were other factors working against their
organization which contributed to the fastener controversy.
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) require
all government activities to solicit competitive bids for
fasteners and that they be manufactured in the United
States. They were required to buy from the bidder with the
lowest price. What this competition created was many small
distributors buying counterfeit fasteners from overseas
manufacturers and passing them off as U.S. manufactured
bolts to DISC. Some of the small distributors may have
purchased the fasteners from other distributors in good
faith, not knowing that they were counterfeit. By
purchasing the cheap foreign-made fasteners, they could
undercut the U.S. manufacturers' prices.
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The Defense Industrial Supply Center was also
required, under the FARs, to set aside at least 50% of their
fastener business for small businesses. This resulted in
most fastener orders having low contract costs and being in
small quantities and lot sizes. At one point, there were
more than 1800 open contracts at DISC for grade 8 bolts
alone.
Many of DISC'S attempts to keep counterfeit
fasteners out were aggravated by the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) . By law and under the FARs, the SBA
determines if a small business is capable of fulfilling a
contract. They accomplish this by inspecting small
businesses and if found acceptable, issuing a Certificate of
Competency (COC) . Once a COC is issued they are eligible to
bid on appropriate contracts, and if they are the low
bidder, must be awarded the contract. However, if DISC has
a problem with a supplier and cannot convince the SBA to
remove a business' COC, they have no choice but to continue
patronizing that contractor. There are several examples of
DISC'S inability to exclude a company when dissatisfied with
nonconforming bolts. One example would be the case of
Highland Bolt and Nut of Utica, Michigan. Highland had been
supplying DISC nonconforming bolts between 1982 and 1986.
DISC tried to deny them contracts. However, the SBA issued
a COC which required that Highland, as the qualified low
bidder, receive the contracts. DISC repeatedly, but
43
unsuccessfully, tried to convince the SBA to remove
Highland's COC. Finally, in 1988, DISC was able to have
Highland debarred. [Ref. 19:p. 25]
While DISC was sampling all lots received, they were
able to identify 50 vendors who supplied nonconforming
fasteners. They took the administrative actions allowed
them under the FARs. However, that has not prevented some
of the undesirable vendors from continuing to do business
with DISC. [Ref. 19:pp. 22-23]
C. CORRECTIVE ACTION
The Defense Industrial Supply Center concedes that they
cannot continue to inspect every fastener shipment they
receive. They do not have the resources to continue that
type of testing. In the future, testing and quality
assurance clauses will be written into contracts exceeding
$25,000. Contracts below that threshold will be randomly
inspected. The quality assurance personnel at DISC will
also look at past performance and any other indicators that
might make a supplier's quality questionable. The random
tests combined with the possible repercussion of no longer
being able to do business with DoD is intended to keep the
distributors honest. [Ref. 4:pp. 200-202]
The Defense Industrial Supply Centers ' s situation is
unique in that the volume of fasteners handled is large.
They indicated that there are inadequate resources available
to continue inspecting all lots. This problem must be
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doubly present for the small business purchasing fasteners.
Their volume would not permit them the opportunity of
requiring tests from their suppliers. Further, they would
not have the resources for a test and evaluation division.
D. FASTENER VOLUME
It is difficult to appreciate the full magnitude of the
problem at DISC without understanding the sheer volume of
the business they handle. As a command, they supply over
2.5 million items to the armed services. This represents
60% of the total supplies used by DoD. In one year, DISC
makes contract payments exceeding $50 billion. They support
a wide range of military hardware to all services.
DISC processes an incredible number of fasteners. They
manage over 900 National Stock Numbers (NSN) for grades 8
and 8.2 fasteners. They purchased about 100 million grade 8
bolts in a two-year period. DISC has already determined
that 30 million of its current fastener inventory is
counterfeit. If all fasteners are considered, and not only
the grades 8 and 8.2 bolts, the magnitude of the volume




In this chapter, a history of the fastener problems at
the Defense Industrial Supply Center was presented. It
included the fact that a civilian distributor discovered the
counterfeit fastener problem and how the industry trade
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organization made the information available for the fastener
consumers, including DISC.
DISC'S internal procedures allowing the counterfeit
fastener problem to enter DoD's supply system were reviewed.
The external factors of DISC'S problem as a command may have
contributed to the problem nationwide, because the
contracting procedures encouraged the lowest price. The
lowest price motive encouraged small businesses to find ways
to undercut the competition, even at the expense of quality.
DISC has now implemented actions to correct the counter-
feit fastener problem within their organization. Primarily,
they are tightening steps taken to ensure compliance with
the standards. It is now believed that DISC'S inventories
are purged of the nonconforming fasteners.
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V. THE F/A-18; A FASTENER SUCCESS STORY
The F/A-18 Hornet is a lightweight and highly maneuver-
able fighter attack aircraft. This aircraft quickly
transforms from the fighter role to the attack role, with
only changes in computer software and weapons racks. High
reliability and maintainability were designed into the
airframe. Maintenance manhours per flight hour were
estimated at 10.3 for the F/A-18 where the F-4S, an aircraft
F/A-18 was replacing, required 30.9. [Ref. 20:p. 377]
The F/A-18 uses a wide range of fasteners. Fasteners
are made from a broad range of materials. They range from
ferrous and non-ferrous, to non-metallic (plastics). The
Hornet's fasteners are primarily fabricated of aluminum
alloy, titanium, stainless steel, and alloy steel. Appendix
B illustrates the F/A-18 's fasteners. There are some
fastener design defects. However, there is no indication
that they have experienced a counterfeit or substandard
fastener problem. Direct contact with the Aviation Supply
Office (ASO) indicated that no known quality problems exist
with F/A-18 fasteners. [Ref. 21] ASO is responsible for
supply support of Navy aircraft. They track all supply
issues that impact Naval aircraft such as out of stock
parts, parts inventories, and parts quality problems.
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A. GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS IN FASTENER SELECTION
The Department of the Navy's acquisition process
consists of four phases:
- Concept Exploration/Definition.
- Concept Demonstration and Validation.
- Full Scale Engineering Development.
- Production/Deployment.
The total project management process also considers the
mission needs prior to the Concept Exploration/Definition
phase and operations support, and weapons system retirement
after the Production/Deployment phase. The mission needs,
operations support, and system retirement components will
not be discussed in this thesis. During the acquisition
phases, certain events which can affect fastener selection
must occur before entering into the next phase.
The intent of the Concept Exploration/Definition phase
is to solicit and evaluate various concepts that will meet
or exceed the mission needs. The Navy uses in-house Navy
Research and Development laboratories, universities, and
industry to develop and evaluate the different concepts.
[Ref. 22:pp. 1-13] During this phase, there is no attempt
to standardize or limit approaches that satisfy the require-
ments. The fastener selection would be irrelevant at this
point but, if considered, would be based on the best
solution possible and would not consider standardization or
what is available in the market place. This phase produces
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concept documentation describing possible systems which
satisfy the mission. It also highlights any deviations to
the normal acquisition policy, such as competition
feasibility, streamlining, and production risks. [Ref.
22:pp. 3-17]
The Concept Demonstration and Validation phase identi-
fies the system concepts having the greatest potential for
meeting the mission needs in a cost effective manner.
During this phase, analyses, hardware fabrication, and test
and evaluation will establish risks and uncertainties for at
least one of the developed concepts. The objective is to
reduce the risks to acceptable levels, and verify that the
required technology is available to complete the project.
[Ref. 22 :p. 3-26] For fasteners, any special fastener
requirements would be identified and solutions would have to
be developed.
The Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) phase
produces the first prototype, a product baseline configura-
tion design and a documentation package containing costs,
schedule, logistic supportability, and performance
constraints. The goal is to demonstrate and document a cost
effective, reducible, operationally suitable, reliable, and
maintainable production engineered system that meets the
mission need. This is the first point at which a standar-
dized flyable aircraft is constructed. It will be exten-
sively tested to establish the hardware baseline, and to
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ensure that all of the functional and technical objectives
can be achieved. The system attributes such as reliability,
maintainability, safety and supportability, are established
by the design. [Ref. 62:pp. 3-35— 3-38] With consideration
given to which fasteners are available, contract require-
ments and other special requirements which must be satis-
fied, the selection of fasteners is completed.
During the FSED phase, a technical evaluation of the
prototype is accomplished. Based upon the results of the
evaluation, there are several critical issues to be
addressed. One of these issues is configuration management.
The hardware baseline configuration is established. Any
subsequent changes to the baseline vehicle must be
considered carefully. Usually, the contractor no longer has
the authority to change the baseline, as they did earlier in
the development of the system. The program office now
manages changes in the baseline. [Ref. 22:pp. 3-39— 3-40]
Fastener selection is complete and any changes must have a
strong overriding justification.
The weapons system then moves into low rate initial
production, which is part of the FSED. This provides an
opportunity to ensure that construction can proceed in the
production environment, based upon the data package avail-
able. Some other events occurring concurrently are valida-
tion of manuals and training, conducting advanced system
50
testing and updating the production design. [Ref. 22: pp. 3-
41— 3-42]
The Production and Deployment phase is directed toward
providing the desired operational capability and inventory
levels. During this phase, configuration control is
practiced rigorously. Changes are allowed only when
justified by cost effectiveness or correction of problems or
failures. [Ref. 22 :p. 3-49] Changes in fastener selection
would be rare now. From this point, the weapons system
proceeds through the remainder of its life cycle.
B. F/A-18 FASTENER SELECTION PROCESS
McDonnell Douglas was contractually required to develop
a standardization plan while designing the F/A-18 Hornet. A
section of the plan addresses parts control and standardiza-
tion. Parts control and standardization pertains to all
electrical, electronic, mechanical, hydraulic and pneumatic
parts, used in contractor-furnished airborne equipment, the
airframe and Group Support Equipment (GSE) designed during
aircraft development. "The objective is to maximize the use
of derated high reliability parts and minimize the part
types in AV-8B and F/A-18 designs." [Ref. 23 :p. 2-1]
To reach selection of particular fasteners, the parts
control and standardization program, an element of the
standardization plan, coordinates and controls the
selection, documentation, procurement and approval of parts.
This begins during the Concept Demonstration and Validation
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phase and is completed during the Full Scale Engineering
Development phase. [Ref. 23 :p. 2-1]
Parts that need no approval by the Navy are those parts
identified by government furnished baselines for the
specific weapon system. These are called standard parts.
The contractor has to track which standard parts have been
selected. During design, a list of nonstandard and nonbase-
line parts are compiled into a Program Parts Selection List
(PPSL) . This list is forwarded to the Navy for approval.
Any parts that are not on the approved PPSL or not standard
are nonstandard parts. The priority of parts selection is
standard parts, parts from the PPSL, and nonstandard parts.
All nonstandard parts must be approved by the Navy prior to
use. [Ref. 23:p. 2-2]
All of the parts in the PPSL are controlled by either a
Military Specification/Standard, a DoD/Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) approved industry standard, or a standar-
dized military drawing. All the Hornet's fasteners are
listed in the PPSL.
A major sub-element of the parts control and standardi-
zation program is the Fastener Usage Policy (FUP) . The FUP
establishes the criteria for the selection and application
of mechanical fasteners in the F/A-18 aircraft. The design
intention is to provide structurally efficient connections
which will be reliable and trouble free. [Ref. 23 :p. 2-4]
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McDonnell Douglas' FUP establishes criteria for the
selection and application of mechanical fasteners in the
F/A-18 aircraft. Specific elements called out in the
Fastener Usage Policy are: selection criteria, usage
limitations, hole call out information, and fastener
strength allowances. It further divides fasteners into the
major groupings of solid rivets, pin and collar fasteners,
blind fasteners, bolts and nuts, and miscellaneous
fasteners. [Ref. 24 :p. vi]
To ensure that fasteners chosen are appropriate for the
materials being jointed, the FUP has a table of preferred,
acceptable and prohibited fastener materials. For example:
two pieces of aluminum being joined will not have a copper
fastener. This is prohibited by the FUP because copper can
cause severe galvanic effects in aluminum. [Ref. 24: pp.
VIII-X] Appendix C is the Fastener Material Table with the
qualifiers explaining why some combinations are preferred,
acceptable and prohibited. The intent is to reduce the
incidence of fastener failure resulting from misapplication
and design error.
The application of fasteners is considered specifically
in the FUP. The policy contains an entire appendix devoted
to the design allowances of fasteners. It considers the
shear strength of each fastener on the F/A-18. There are
charts indicating the maximum shear strength in relation to
the fastener diameter and the thickness of the material.
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They also provide guidance on acceptable or unacceptable use
of the fastener listed. Appendix D is a representative
example.
Appendix D of the FUP describes a step by step procedure
for selecting fasteners. The procedure attempts to find the
lowest common denominator, in terms of fasteners, to satisfy
the requirements for joining structural doors and access
panels. McDonnell Douglas has attempted to eliminate any
questions or inconsistencies in fastener selection.
A representative example of fastener application is
presented in Appendix E. [A1-F18AC-LMM-010 , door 79] There
are nine different acceptable fasteners, and 384 individual
fasteners on this door. The selection process appears to
have worked. Inspection of the usage data on part numbers
HT402 5L6-16, and NAS664VSHT, at NAS Lemoore ' s supply depart-
ment indicated low usage. The quarterly usage for the two
parts was ten and eight respectively. Navy-wide procurement
of HT4025L6-16 was 11,274 in 1986, with no subsequent
purchases indicated. For NAS664VSHT, there were 7700
procured in 1987 with no subsequent purchases indicated.
These numbers indicate amounts procured and don't indicate
the number of applications the fasteners are employed in.
[Ref. 13]
Maintenance personnel interviewed at NAS Lemoore
indicated their biggest maintenance problem was corrosion
causing fasteners to seize. [Ref. 13] The documentation
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procedures the Navy uses, in most cases, does not reflect
the manhours consumed by removing and replacing fasteners.
Accordingly, there is no evidence to support technicians'
belief that large amounts of time is spent on fasteners. An
Air Force study also came to this same conclusion; namely,
that the real scope of the fastener maintenance problem is
unknown. However, General Goodell of the Air Force Staff
stated that 50% of the manhours spent on the F-15 aircraft
were fixing fastener problems and up to 40% of rework
activity is due to fastener problems. The Navy, which
operates in the same or even a more demanding environment,
most likely experiences the same conditions.
The standardization plan seeks to limit the number of
parts on the aircraft, while still satisfying airframe
engineering requirements. Appendix B, which was drawn from
the FUP, is a diagram showing what basic types of fasteners
McDonnell Douglas has determined are the minimum necessary
to satisfy airframe requirements.
C. QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES
The selection methods do not reflect the purchasing and
quality assurance process. McDonnell Douglas endeavors to
obtain high quality fasteners by purchasing to military
specifications or industry standards. In the case of the
F/A-18, the pertinent military and civilian documents are
listed in Appendix F. They track the quality record of
their sources and have a receiving inspection program.
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Further, their "procurement people try to buy direct from
manufacturers." [Ref. 26] In effect, they avoid
distributors.
During initial development of the weapons system,
McDonnell Douglas acquires their own fasteners. Throughout
the Department of Defense, the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) acts as a central manager for common use spare parts.
DLA purchases and forwards requisitioned fasteners to all of
the services. As an aircraft enters the fleet, ASO assumes
responsibility within the Navy for supplying replacement
fasteners. They accomplish this by tracking DLA and Navy
Supply Center inventory levels. ASO assumes the fasteners
received from DLA meet the specified requirements. ASO has
indicated that no quality problems have been experienced
with any F/A-18 fasteners. [Ref. 21]
The Aviation Supply Office and DLA work together to
ensure DLA contracts for Navy requirements. The Aviation
Supply Office provides a list of required fasteners for new
weapons systems to DLA, which is used to ensure that they
stock the correct items. The list contains possible
vendors. They generate their list for DLA based on a list
of fasteners used on the aircraft which is prepared by
McDonnell Douglas. The contractor also provides a list of
possible vendors. [Ref. 21]
As stated, there are no known problems with quality on
Hornet fasteners. However, one of McDonnell Douglas'
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fastener suppliers, Voi-Shan, has been suspended from doing
business with the government. Voi-Shan is under suspicion
for "routinely falsified manufacturing reports and test
results from January 1980 through February (1989)." [Ref.
27] Under the suspension, government contractors and
subcontractors cannot purchase from Voi-Shan. It is
McDonnell Douglas' policy not to buy from a suspended
company for any contract, not just government contracts.
[Ref. 26] Voi-Shan has supplied the type fasteners used on
the F/A-18. However, there is no indication that those
fasteners were substandard or counterfeit. [Refs. 21,25]
D. FASTENER USAGE
Fasteners used on the F/A-18 were chosen according to
the FUP. As stated earlier, selection criteria, usage
limitations, hole call out information, and fastener
strength allowances indicate the type of fastener used.
Panels that are commonly opened tend to have bolts or quick
release fasteners. While some of these fasteners have
failed, there has been no indication of procurement quality
problems. The primary reason for fastener failures on the
F/A-18 have been corrosion, over-stressed loads, and the
finish on titanium fasteners. Corrosion is the single most
common cause of fastener failure. Even these failures
appear rare, based on the usage data of F/A-18 fasteners,
provided by NAS Lemoore ' s supply department.
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One of the biggest problems with identifying fastener
deficiencies is that no failure data are collected.
Fastener replacement and repairs are included in other
systems maintenance actions. In an Air Force study,
fasteners were the second largest problem for line
personnel, with tools considered the only area that was
worse. [Ref. 28: p. 2 0b] Fasteners account for more than
40% of the structural failures on Air Force aircraft. [Ref.
65]
The Navy has the same deficiency in tracking fastener
failures. Minor maintenance such as tightening screws on
panels during post-flight checks are not documented.
Fastener tightening is documented as a post-flight check,
which includes other items not related to fasteners.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the government's approach to
fastener selection and standardization. The Department of
Defense acquisition process was studied, highlighting the
points where fastener selection was critical and who
controlled final fastener selection in the development
process of new weapons systems.
McDonnell Douglas' F/A-18 fastener usage policy was
examined as it relates to the Department of Defense
acquisition process. It went on to show how DLA gets their
list of fasteners and possible vendors.
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Both McDonnell Douglas' and DLA's quality assurance
practices were reviewed. This examination was based upon
the practices that were in place during the development and
early deployment of the F/A-18. Also highlighted was the
failure of the process for both the contractor and DLA, in
selection of reputable vendors. Despite DLA's quality
assurance practices in obtaining fasteners, the Hornet has
no known fastener procurement quality deficiencies.
The final element of this chapter was a brief descrip-
tion of the problem in identifying aircraft fastener
failures. The two most significant points are: the volume
of failures, and the inability of the Air Force and the Navy
to track those types of failures.
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VI. ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the
counterfeit fastener issue as it relates to the Department
of Defense (DoD) . Specific areas of attention have been
given to standards in general, fastener standards, and the
methods in which the standards are applied. The source of
information for this paper has been developed from site
visits, personal interviews, and a review of the literature
on the topic.
' Chapter I gave a brief presentation of the role of
standards and fasteners in the economy today. It was
followed by an overview of the counterfeit fastener problem
in Chapter II. A complete description of the primary
fasteners being considered was included. Chapter III was a
primer on standards and specifications. A description of
the fastener problem at the Defense Industrial Supply Center
(DISC) , which is the focal point of this issue for DoD, was
presented in Chapter IV. In Chapter V the F/A-18 Hornet was
used to illustrate how the fastener selection and procure-
ment process works.
A. FASTENER STANDARDS
Chapter III provides a complete explanation of how
standards are generated, why they are so widely accepted,
and why they are so necessary. Voluntary standards are the
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cornerstone of our economic system. They are a public good,
available to all such that no single person can be denied
their use. Standards must be recognized and consistently
applied in the economic system in order to perform their
service. When this does not occur, the exchange system
begins to break down. Therefore, it is critical that
standards are developed and enforced to further economic
activity and development.
The key issue remains: most standards in use today are
voluntary and our economic system is dependent upon these
standards. The fact that standards are primarily voluntary
places the burden of enforcement upon the person or
organization requesting a certain standard. The organiza-
tions which draft the standards realize this, as indicated
by the requirement for enforcement being placed upon the
consumers in the standards documents.
Fastener standards are similar to most voluntary
standards. Fastener standards must also be consistently
applied and conformed with. Recently, standard compliance
has been misrepresented by unethical manufacturers and
distributors. They have knowingly represented grade 8.2 or
less fasteners as grade 8. This shows the standards and
economic system breaking down within the fastener industry.
Traditionally, blame would be placed on the unethical
businessmen who compromised the standards. However, the
burden of enforcement is on the end user. A breakdown in
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the standards system would then be the responsibility of
both the supplier an the consumer. The supplier would be
responsible for not complying with the voluntary standard,
as is accepted practice. The consumer would be responsible
for not ensuring compliance.
The government is considering intervening in voluntary
standards compliance. House Resolution (HR) 3000 is the
most recent proposal. The intent is to provide a public
good, in that all members of society would be protected from
counterfeit fasteners. This would impose a cost which would
be reflected in the purchase price of fasteners. However,
no one manufacturer or consumer would be saddled with this
expense. The value of a protected public and government
could outweigh the cost.
There is a problem with HR 3000 as it is currently
written. The general purpose and approach is correct.
However, the proposed law is drafted in such a way as to
provide a means of avoiding the requirements by the use of
the small lot exception. The exception would encourage
manufacturers and distributors to sell in small lots of 50
items or less. The economic advantage would soon be lost as
all sales would be in lots of 50 or less. No public good
would be created and the public would remain at risk from
counterfeit and/or substandard fasteners.
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B. COUNTERFEIT FASTENERS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Defense Industrial Supply Center is the focus of
this issue within the DoD. It is the primary source of
fasteners for the military services and one of the largest
single purchasers of fasteners in the United States. Its
actions not only impact the government, but the civilian
market as well.
The Defense Industrial Supply Center, as required by the
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) , competed the
contracts for fasteners. The intent was to procure
fasteners at the lowest possible cost. This approach has
merit. However, their method for ensuring compliance was
questionable at best. DISC relied on Certificates Of
Compliance, which placed their quality totally at the
discretion of their suppliers. The result appears to have
been the introduction of counterfeit and substandard
fasteners into DoD's inventories.
There were contributing factors that aggravated DISC'S
problem. They would not have had any impact if DISC had
taken responsibility for quality. Within DISC'S organiza-
tion, their personnel conceded that standard enforcement had
become lax. The primary reason for this was a lack of
resources. As a result of not enforcing the standards used
to procure fasteners, DISC allowed this problem to occur
within the Department of Defense.
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C. THE F/A-18 FASTENER SELECTION AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The Navy has very specific procedures for the develop-
ment and procurement of new weapons systems. McDonnell
Douglas was contractually required to follow these
procedures. They did this in a methodical and effective
manner. The result has been high quality application of the
correct standard and fastener to the requirement. The
actual selection process appears to be very effective.
Early in the F/A-18 development process McDonnell
purchased fasteners outside of the defense department.
Their process again appears to be effective. Key elements
include: avoiding distributors and purchasing from the
manufacturer whenever possible, a receiving inspection
program, and tracking the quality record of their sources.
These steps appear to have protected McDonnell Douglas from
counterfeit fasteners.
McDonnell Douglas was not able to avoid the unethical
businesses. Voi-Shan, currently a suspected supplier of
counterfeit fasteners, was one of their suppliers. The
procurement procedures followed by McDonnell Douglas
successfully prevented Voi-Shan from attempting to pass on
counterfeit fasteners to the company.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems experienced by DISC could have been
avoided. The experiences of the F/A-18 indicate that a
strong acceptance inspection program will deter suppliers
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from providing a substandard product. Although the exact
type of fasteners that impacted DISC'S inventories are
different than those used on the F/A-18, the concepts are
the same. Further, the grade of fasteners that the F/A-18
utilizes have a quality problem of their own which DISC is
resolving. However, the F/A-18 continues to have no
quality problems with their fasteners. This would seem to
validate the inspection program.
The issue of compromising standards can impact any
product. The lessons learned from the grade 8 fasteners
have been hard, yet they could be applied to almost any
product which the government purchases.
The Department of Defense is in a better position to
inspect and protect their interests than are most small
businesses. Government intervention in the standard setting
process can have a far-reaching effect. The small business-
man may need the government's help in protecting himself and
his customers. The externality of the government
intervening in the standards setting process may be a better
protected government, resulting in a better protected
populace.
The opposite perspective might be that government
intervention in standards is the first step in the
government becoming involved in more and more aspects of the
public's daily routine. This could be placed under the
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guise of a "public good." Thus, the externality of govern-
ment intervention may not always be considered positive.
There are three basic recommendations derived from the
research on this thesis. The first is for DoD to inspect
incoming products according to the pertinent specifications
and the customary commercial practices. This approach has
consistently been the most effective means of ensuring
standard compliance.
The second recoinmendation is for the Department of
Defense to examine other means of contracting in a
competitive market. Selecting a supplier based solely upon
the least cost, as indicated in this thesis, will not always
satisfy the requirements. The Food Machines Corporation
(FMC) has developed a process that rewards quality
suppliers. Their system takes a number of factors into
consideration, such as quality and delivery performance.
Suppliers are graded on those factors, and follow-on source
selection considers those grades. There are other companies
that have similar systems. DoD would be well advised to
examine a number of them and develop the one that would
ideally suit their needs.
The final recommendation is that DoD support HR 3000.
If this bill becomes law, DoD will have real recourse for
substandard suppliers. The quality and inspection costs in
administering fastener contracts can also be reduced. HR
3000 will also help protect the small businessman and the
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general public. This recommendation is qualified in that
the small lot exception of the bill should be eliminated,




EXCERPT FROM SAE J4 29 STANDARDS
This is an excerpt from the SAE Standard J429. It shows
the grade designations, the mechanical requirements, and
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Appendix B illustrates the fastener types used on the
F/A-18. This table includes head types, fastener materials,
and the advantages and disadvantages. The source is
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APPENDIX C
F/A-18 FASTENER MATERIAL TABLE
This appendix indicates what type materials may be
joined with certain type fastener materials. It provides
preferred, acceptable and prohibited applications.
Justifications are provided in the notes. The source is
McDonnell Aircraft Company's fastener usage policy.
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Aluminum Coated / 3\
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Cd Plated Fasteners /3\
Graphite Composite Titanium PH13-8M0 /^/A
A-286 A A
Zi\ Monel /^








Aluminum coating system per MCAIR P.S. 13143.
These alloys can cause severe galvanic effects in aluminum.
Cadmium or aluminum coat will galvanically corrode in a short time when
in contact with titanium. This then leaves the steel fastener unprotect-
ed. In addition, tiiere is evidence that cadmium in contact with titanium
can cause microcracks in the titanium after a short period of only
moderately elevated temperature and sustained tension stress.
Small amounts of aluminum (fastener) or aluminum coat will galvanically
corrode in a short time when surrounded by large amounts of titanium
(joined material). Aluminum fasteners or aluminum coated fasteners are
acceptable for joining aluminum to titanium only if the fastener is wet
installed per MCAIR PS 13607 or PS 11344 as applicable in a well drained
area.
Bare titanium . A-286 ^and PH13-8Mo fasteners are suitable in contact with
aluminum or aluminum/ t Itanium combination structure, only if wet installed
per MCAIR PS 13607 or PS 11344 as applicable. These materials are
compatible with titanium structure without a barrier.
/Vf COO/V/Vei- L DOUGUAS C OrtF'OFt AT icyi\i
MDC A367 2
C lb December 1978
A6\ Graphite combined with any fastener material other than titanium will
result in corrosion of the fastener.
/7\ Cadmium plated steel fasteners in aluminum on exterior locations shall
be avoided. REASON : Rusting occurs in approx. 12 months or less and
produces galvanically promoted corrosion of the aluminum. Acceptable
for use on internal structure.
A Use of these fastener materials are acceptable contingent upon:
o permanency,
o wet installation with sealant per MCAIR PS 13607 or PS 113A4 as appli-
cable.
o overspray of fastener patterns with sealant.
Do not use except when availability dictates or cost significant. Tita-
nium preferred.
D. Care is required to assure that no loose fasteners or fastener
elements can be drawn into engine inlets to cause foreign object damage to
engines. Engine inlet duct skins should not contain blind fasteners or
threaded fasteners secured only by self-locking nuts. l-Then threaded
fasteners are required in this area they should be safetved with cotter p/ins
or lockwire. This restriction includes those pin and collar fastener types
in which the "collar" is essentially a locknut
.
E. The upper sheet of a shear joint, when countersunk to receive a
flush fastener head, shall always be thick enough to contain the entire
countersink without a sharp edge at the bottom. The knife edge of sheet
represents a significant stress riser. In addition, there is a tendency for
the flush head to tilt and ride up the slope of the countersink resulting
in a low joint yield strength and reduced fastener fatigue life. The ratio
(maximum countersink depth divided by minimum sheet thickness) shall be no
more than 0.7 for fatigue critical structure and no more than 0.8 for anv
other structural applications.
F. Interference fit fasteners or fasteners that feature shank expansion
during installation must not be used in composites or in niecal applications chat
would impart sever peripheral tension stress in materials subject to stress
corrosion cracking (see Note "M" - Ceneral Critiera) .
G. Some fastener t'-'pes such as solid rivets and stump lockbolts rerinire
high forces for installation which can, in some cases, damage rigid structure
such as castings, machined flanges, and composite structure. Every effort
should be made to avoid fastener installations in which tlitre is potential for
structural damage. Problem areas include:
Severe Loads : Vibration driving of titanium solid rivets.
A*CDO/V/VEI_I- DOUGL/XS CO FtfO Fl ATI OfV
MDC A3672
MCDOhjiMmLL. AitrcFiAFT coryiPA/>/v A U April 1:177
Moderate Loads : VlbraCion driving of aluminum solid rivets or stump
lockbolts.
No Problem : Fasteners that are squeeze driven or are installed by rotating
a threaded nut or collar.
H. Dimpling is more expensive than countersinking, and should be avoided.
I. Fasteners of titanium and aluminum have low enough magnetic perm-
eability to be suitable for nonmagnetic applications. Low alloy steel and
PHI3-8M0 material fasteners must be avoided in such applications.
J. Final size fastener holes may be punched (rather than drilled or
reamed) only when specifically permitted by Engineering drawing. Because tool
marks in the thickness direction can be severe stress risers, hole punching
(by Drawing Note) shall be allowed only in non-structure parts, such as
6M62 cut-outs in shims and spacers.
K. Attempts should be made to avoid locating fasteners directly oppo-
site each other in the legs of angles of 90° or less unless there is adequate
access space.
L. Lockwashers shall not be used since they damage the finish system
setting up corrosion paths.
M. Restrictions on interference fit and expanding shank fasteners in
materials with high to moderate stress corrosion cracking resistance are as
follows
:
/VfCDO^rVELl. DOUGLAS C O FtPO HATIO f<>l
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APPENDIX D
F/A-18 FASTENER ALLOWANCES TABLE
Appendix D illustrates the fastener allowances in terms
of strengths and applications. The source is McDonnell
Aircraft Company's fastener usage policy.
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F-18 FASTENER ALLOWABLES
Effective Ultimate Allowable Strengths for Close Fit




NAS 663VH - 668VH
95 Ksr SHEAR TITANIUM FASTENERS
Bolt Size S10 1/4 5/15 1 3/8 7/16 1/2
Single Shear Strength 2,690 4 650 7,300 10,500 14 300 18 650
Sheet Material Bare and Clad 7075T6
-0 0012 K)0017 *-0 0017 -0 0017 KD0O17 -0 0017
HoleSizt 0.1900 02495 0.3120 0.3745 0.4370 0.4995
-0.0005 -00000 -00000 -0 0000 -00000 -0 0000
0.063 1 284
0071 1,404 1,938
0.080 1,54« 2,205 2.580
090 1,G95 2,415 3,070 3.565 4 475
0.100 1,848 2,607 3,438 4 060 4,910 5.100
0.125 2,235 3,096 4,038 5.121 6,000 6,791
0.160 2,690 3,825 4.944 6,165 7,400 8,812
190 4.425 5,700 7,080 8.560 10,202
0.250 4,650 7,215 8.380 10,750 12.450




1. All atr«ngt±i8 are for 2D or greater ©dgo distance.
2. Reference MCAIR 339, Page 1.36.
3. Refer to Figure C-ll.i for interpolation curves.
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F/A-18 FASTENER APPLICATION EXAMPLE
Appendix E is an excerpt from the F/A-18 maintenance
manual. It is an example of a common application of
fasteners on the F/A-18. The illustration highlights the









1 Screw i j } HT4025LR-16 7 S5-125








3 [Screw NAS664V16HT 22 40-60
4 [Screw NAS66-1VSHT 127 40-60
5 jScrew NAS6G5V9HT 60 |65.95
6 .Screw 1 2 > HT4025L5-16 1 85-125
T [Screw NAS665V20HT 54 65-95
6 iScrew NAS665V9HT 46 65-95
9 [Screw NAS654V8HT 67 40-60
.LEGEND
!
"~> 161353 THRU 16152S.
- } Install fasteners wet with MIL-S-83430 sealing compound.
For preparation and application {A1-F1SAC-SRM-20U,
WPOll 00).
n \ F/A-ISA. F/A-ISB 161702 AND UP.
























F/A-18 PREFERRED FASTENER LISTING
Appendix F is a list of standards used for preferred
fasteners on the F/A-18. The list is an excerpt from
McDonnell Aircraft Company's fastener usage policy. When
one of the standards is selected for use, no further
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F-18 PREFERRED FASTENERS
This appendix provides a lisc of those fasteners and fastener elements
discussed in this report. They are arranged numerically by part number:


















































DESIGN INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MOST OF
THESE DRAWINGS Cr^N BE FOUND IN THE STANDARDS
PARTS ^LANUAL. ST/uN'DARD "M" DR.\WINGS/SPECIFI-
CATION (nUXXX, 3MXXX, ST3M\XX, 4>L\X>: , ETC.)
ARE AVAILABLE FROM MCAIR ENGINEERING DRAWINGS
REFERENCE FILES OR BLUEPRINT CRIBS/FILES.
COPIES OF MILIT.ARY (MS, .A.N , M>DCOLX , ETC.)
AND INSUSTRY (NAS) STANDARD DRAWINGS ARE











































































A^COO/V/VEl-l. DOUGUAS CO FtF'O Ft AT IO IM
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Hemenway, D. , Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards .
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975.
2. Blake, A., What Every Engineer Should Know About
Threaded Fasteners Materials and Design . Marcel Dekker
Inc. , 1986.
3. Society of Automotive Engineers Handbook
. Part 1,
Society of Automotive Engineers, 1975.
4. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Counterfeit Metal
Fasteners, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1988.
5. Advisory Update; Mismarked and/or Substandard
Fasteners, Industrial Fasteners Institute, April 1988.
6. Cayer, S., "Suppose There's a World 'White Goods' War!,"
Purchasing
.
Vol. 106, 9 March 1989.
7. Sullivan, CD., Standards and Standardization Basic
Principles and Applications . Marcel Dekker Inc., 1983.
8. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, An Overview of the
Defense Standardization and Specification Program
(DSSP) . Naval Publications and Forms Center, 1 May 1983.
9. Department of Defense, Defense Standardization and
Specification Program, DoD Directive 4120.3 . Department
of Defense, 10 February 1979.
10. Toth, R.B., et al
.
, The Economics of Standardization
.
Standards Engineering Society, 1984.
11. Vint, R.D., An Assessment of Department of Defense
Qualified Products List (QPL) . Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1987.
12. The Department of Defense, Enhancing Defense Standardi-




13. Dreher, T.H. , "Editorial," Fastener Technolocfv
International . Vol. 12, April 1988.
14. The 100th Congress, House Resolution 5051. The Fastener
Quality Assurance Act of 1988 . Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 14 July 1988.
15. Comiskey, S.W. and Pendley, W.P., "Debarment:
Government-Approved Blacklisting," Fastener Technology
International . Vol. 12, February/March 1989.
16. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology,
Counterfeit Bolts and Fasteners . Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1988.
17. The 100th Congress, House Resolution 5120. The Standar-
dization of Measurement Act of 1988 . Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1 August 1988.




Washington, D.C., 25 July 1989.
19. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, The Threat from Substandard Fasteners:
Is America Losing Its Grip? , Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., July 1988.
20. Polmar, N. , The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet .
13th ed.. Naval Institute Press, 1984.
21. Telephone conversation between Major Gilda Jackson,
USMC, Code WMB14-A, Aviation Supply Office and the
author, 31 July 1989.
22. Navy Program Manager's Guide
. Department of the Navy,
1988.
23. McDonnell Aircraft Company, Report MDC B0842, T/AV-8B &
F/A-18 Standardization Plan . 8 April 1987.
24. McDonnell Aircraft Company, Report MDC A3672, F-18
Fastener Usage Policy , by R.E. Smith, 17 February 1976.
25. Naval Air Systems Command, F/A-18 Maintenance Manual Al-
F18AC-LMM-010.
85
26. Telephone conversation between Mr. Robert E. Smith,
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., and the author, 10 July
1989.
27. Carnevale, M.L., "Pentagon Bars Fairchild Unit From Job
Bids," Wall Street Journal . 1 May 1989.
28. Lehmann, W.L., et al
.
, "Aircraft Mechanical Infrastruc-
ture Research and Development Needs," USAF Scientific
Advisory Board AD HOC Committee Initial Draft, 26 June
1989.
29. Telephone conversation between LtCol Phil Aitken-Cade,




Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
Mr. R.E. Smith 1
Staff Engineer
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company
Box 516
St Louis, Missouri 63166
LtCol Phil Aitken-Cade USAF 1
Capital Towers Apt 6B
7 Clayton Street
Montgomery, Alabama 36107
Prof. Paul M. Carrick, Code 54Ca 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000




Defense Logistics Studies Information 2
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort lee, Virginia 23801
Mr. Dale Manning 1
Code AIR 53033G
Naval Air Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20361
LCDR David J. Beck 5
AIMD, IM-1 Division
USS Nimitz (CVN-68)
FPO Seattle, Washington 98780-2820
87
10. LCDR John C. Boyce
CVW-11
FPO San Francisco, California 96601
11. LCDR Larry W. Johnston
Navy Supply Corps School
Athens, Georgia 30606
88




/
tastetvet
itatv'da^
ds.
„i««i^
fi^ %?
1* 6>
1» f>^
Thesis
B3245 Beck
c.l Qualitative fastener
standards.

